Your sighing and dismaying about my disagreement with you is getting tiring. Let's stick to the concrete points, please, or there is no use conversing.
You're not meeting any of the specific challenges i'm raising against the rationality of your views. I have been nothing but honest in my assumptions, yet when I call you out on yours you don't reply. You just spout general rhetoric about what I can't possibly understanding because bla bla bla. It's hard to keep communicating in a good spirit If you keep this up.
And the tragedy is you seem to believe you be are being rational and I'm the one who is lacking. The walls people put up around them are astonishing. I will, again, respond to points you are making and quesitons you raise. You are not displaying me the similar courtesy.
Here's your problem, then: you are assuming a purely physical reality, with no non-physical aspects, even despite your own accessing that physical reality through non-physical means (the mind). (You can attempt to map the mind to brain functions, but various philosophical objections to this proposal still obtain [again, see refutations of behaviouralist, functionalist, and computationalist theories of mind, all of which point to the same].)
Why the correlations between states of the brain and experience, like I have mentioned in previous posts, if consciousness doesn't have a physical basis? Why does your consciousness retreat if you are:
- hit on the head
- parts of your brain are removed
- you take chemicals that effect neurons in the brain?
-Why does the difference in experiential state between being awake and sleep correlate with entirely different patterns of large-scale neuronal activity in the brain?
If you're going to give me more 'the metaphysical always operates in tandem with the physical', then I would like some shred of argument of evidence for this massive assertion. Please stop, and attend to this first
issue before moving on.Secondly
, and this is directly related, I'd like you to answer the following and stop worming around:
3. That if you post a non-physicalist explanation for something that interacts with the physical world (forms, consciousness) you are going to need to have a story about how the non-physical interacts with the physical.
Perhaps you should start again, from what you can know, instead of what you'd like to know. We can't know that we are given accurate information about the world around us at all times (see Descartes), therefore we can discount the exterior as something which we can definitely know; what else is there in our experience but the "interior", the self, the experiencer? This, then, is what we can know, and what we should start from. Seek to know the knower before you seek to know the known; you will find that there is no difference between the two upon the completion of the former practice.
Again, i've already responded to this. Science does seek to know the knower (and in one particular instance of knowing the knower cognitive science debunks your theory of forms, which you have said nothing about).
Also, go to your traditional knowledge of the 'knower' when you have a stroke and your experiences are warped. See how much good it does you.
I drink water because my body requires it for survival. However, I also drink water because I find it enjoyable. Here we have a physical and a not-so-physical explanation for why I drink water. Both are true. Would you discount the latter for being a human imposition, rather than a physical necessity? We're dealing with the world of human conception and interaction, here, so surely the affairs and thoughts of humans are worth something beyond the mere physical constituents of the processes and "objects" under question? Or are you a behaviourist, (wrongly) claiming that the entirety of cognition can be reduced to "behaviours"?
I can't believe my comments in my last post didn't settle this.
Of course human conceptions are important. Write poems that describe your qualitative expierence of water until you're blue in the face, if you like. Write sociological essays on the meanings different cultures have attributed to 'water. However if you're concered with finding out about the ontological nature of parts of the world, seperate from your experience of them, then you're simply not
concerned with "the affairs and thoughts of humans". These are worth something beyond the physical constituents of process and objections under question. But we've been talking about such processes and objects, not about human sentiments towards them!!
Science replaces traditional ontological
understandings of water, not traditional human experiences
with water.... Doesn't it? If so... why not? Please, address this third
issue before moving on. Do you think a molecular understanding of water is not a better ontological picture of water, i.e. as it is in-itself, seperate from our experience of water
, than ontological pictures of water that did not involve molecular chemistry?
To reiterate, for the nth time: you are not able to discuss these things with us for two reasons, namely that you are locked within a wold in which only the physical exists, and you seem not even aware of the contrary literature of which we have at least some understanding. Read the Upanishads, Schuon, and Nasr (Guénon if you have the time), take some psychedelics (which inspire objective visions, not idiosyncratic "hallucinations" - see McKenna [or Hancock] on this). How are you going to discuss something when you're not even acquainted with it?
I will not start quoting what drugs i've taken or books i've read as though these give me authority. I will adress the issues we are talking about. Grow some balls and do the same. I'm after good reasons or evidence for hypotheses. If you can't provide me with either for your theory of forms, or for consciousness being non-physical, don't revert back to sweeping statements. It's not like this is a pissing contest.
Forms have been ignored, i'm guessing because I offered a credible reductive explanation. That is what we started talking about.
Consciousness is problematic, due to the obvious correlations between experience and brain states I keep referring to that you have not really addressed. Your one positive argument for a non-physical basis to consciousness is that it is experiential in nature and it is hard to conceptualise how something experiential can be somthing physical. I agree, and this is mysterious. But it leaves the aforementioned correlations hanging out like a sore dick, and raises deeply problematic quesitons about how something non-physical can interact with the physical (if indeed consciousness IS entirely non-physical). This means, then, the matter is not settled on either side. I then envoked the rationality of putting faith in physicalism as opposed to non-physicalism (if there are problems on either side), as physicalist ontological explanations have time and time again replaced 'traditional' ontological explanations (such as explanations about what water is, in-itself
). You have ignored this. This is a fourth
(Anyway, even if consciouens IS entirely non-physical, I still don't see how this vidicates traditional approaches to understanding ontology. It simply means science will have to include new properties (experiential) into its ontology, right?)
So, there are three or four issues for you to respoind to, highlighted in bold. This is childish, but its become a matter of intellectual honesty. I might be wrong, but unless you show me I'm not satisfied.